Third-party apps in Microsoft 365: how to check what can read your company's mail
Every scheduling tool, e-signature add-in and AI notetaker someone clicked "Accept" on may still be able to read their mailbox. Here's an owner's checklist for finding those apps, reading what they can do, and setting a rule so new ones get a second look.

In brief
In Microsoft 365, any user can let an outside app read their own mailbox, unless your admin has changed the default. Ask your IT person or provider to pull the list from Entra ID > Enterprise apps, check each app's Permissions tab, and remove what nobody uses. Then limit user consent to verified publishers and turn on the admin consent workflow, so new requests come to a person instead of going through on one click.
- By default, any Microsoft 365 user can let an outside app read their own mailbox. Microsoft's documentation says so.
- An app with consent keeps its access after a password reset. You have to revoke the permission itself.
- Ask your IT provider for the list under Entra ID > Enterprise apps, and who granted each app.
- Limit user consent to verified publishers and turn on the admin consent workflow, so new requests get a second look.
- A tool that reads a shared inbox should be scoped to that inbox only, including automation you buy or build.
Why this matters more than it sounds
When someone in your office signs in to a new tool with their Microsoft account, they often see a screen that says the app wants to "read your mail" or "access your calendar." They click Accept, because they want the tool to work. That click is called consent. It gives the app its own key to that person's data.
That key doesn't go away when the person stops using the tool. And it isn't tied to their password. Microsoft's own guidance says that once a malicious app has consent, resetting passwords or requiring multifactor authentication (MFA) won't stop it, because the app sits outside your organization.
Most of the apps you'll find are harmless. A calendar booking tool, an e-signature add-in, a CRM plug-in. The point of the check isn't to panic. It's to know what's there, so the one bad app or the one forgotten tool with too much access doesn't hide in a list nobody reads.
An app with consent has its own key. Changing the password doesn't take it back.
What the default lets people do
Here's the part many owners don't know. Microsoft's documentation says that by default, all users can consent to apps for permissions that don't need an administrator. Its own example: a user can let an app access their mailbox, but can't give an app access to every file in the company.
So the line Microsoft draws is between "my stuff" and "everyone's stuff." The Microsoft Graph permissions reference shows it clearly for mail:
Two versions of the same "read mail" permission
| Version | What Microsoft says it allows | Needs an admin to approve? |
|---|---|---|
| Delegated (Read user mail) | Read the signed-in user's mailbox | No |
| Application (Read mail in all mailboxes) | Read mail in all mailboxes without a signed-in user | Yes |
Source: Microsoft Graph permissions reference, Mail.Read, checked Nov. 9, 2026.
The first one is limited to one person. But think about whose mailbox it is. If your controller, your sales manager or your owner said yes to a tool, that tool can read the inbox where bank details, customer pricing and payroll questions live.
The second one is much bigger, and only an admin can grant it. If you find a non-Microsoft app with that kind of access, someone on your side approved it. You should know who and why.
This isn't only a small-company problem
In January 2024, Microsoft described how the group it calls Midnight Blizzard got into its own corporate email. The attackers guessed the password of an old test account that had no MFA. From there they found an old test app that still had elevated access, created more apps, and used them to get a role that allows access to mailboxes.
Two lessons carry over to a 100-person company. First, the old forgotten app was the way in. Second, the attackers used apps because apps keep access even after the account that created them is shut off, as Microsoft's write-up says.
The more common attack on smaller companies is simpler. Microsoft calls it an illicit consent grant: an attacker sets up an app, then uses a phishing email or a hacked website to trick a user into granting it access to their mail, contacts or documents. No password is stolen. The user simply says yes.
The owner's checklist
You don't need to do these steps yourself. You need to know they exist and ask your IT person or provider to show you the result. Most of it takes an afternoon.
1. Get the list of apps
In the Microsoft Entra admin center, the list lives under Enterprise apps > All applications. Microsoft's steps say to open each app and select Permissions. The Admin consent tab shows what was granted for the whole organization. The User consent tab shows what individual people granted.
For a full export, Microsoft points admins to a script called Get-AzureADPSPermissions.ps1. Its guidance says it dumps every OAuth consent grant for all users into one spreadsheet. A spreadsheet is easier to review in a meeting than clicking through screens.
2. Read it the way Microsoft suggests
Microsoft's guidance gives a short list of what to look for in that export:
- Apps with access to everyone's content. Microsoft's own apps need it. Every non-Microsoft app with it "should be reviewed carefully," in Microsoft's words.
- Read, Write or "All" permissions. These deserve a closer look than read-only access to a profile.
- Who granted it. Consents from high-value users, like finance, sales leadership and owners, get investigated first.
- Odd names. Misspelled, very bland or hacker-sounding app names should be checked.
3. Ask three questions about each app
A simple review sheet
| Question | If the answer is no |
|---|---|
| Does someone here still use it? | Remove it |
| Do we know which company makes it? | Find out before you keep it |
| Does it need this much access to do its job? | Ask the vendor for a narrower setup, or replace it |
The third question matters most for tools that read mail. A scheduling tool may need your calendar. It probably doesn't need to read every message.
4. Remove what you don't need
Admin-granted permissions can be revoked in the admin center. Microsoft notes that permissions granted by a single user can't be revoked from the User consent tab in the portal. Those take PowerShell or a Microsoft Graph call, per the same page. That's a five-minute job for your IT provider, but it's a reason to ask them rather than expecting it to be one button.
Users can also check their own list. Microsoft says people can go to myapps.microsoft.com, see the apps they've given access to, and revoke ones that look wrong. That's a good thing to send to your whole team once a year.
5. Change the default going forward
Cleaning up once doesn't help if the next click adds a new app. Two settings fix that:
- Limit user consent. Microsoft recommends allowing user consent only for apps from verified publishers. A stricter option is to turn user consent off.
- Turn on the admin consent workflow. With it, when someone can't approve an app on their own, they can send a request that goes by email to the admins you name as reviewers. The user is told what was decided. So nobody is stuck, and someone looks first.
6. If an app needs mail, scope it
Some tools really do need to read a shared mailbox, like an orders@ or ap@ inbox. Exchange Online has a feature called RBAC for Applications that lets an admin grant an app access and pair it with a scope, so it can reach only the mailboxes you choose. Microsoft says it replaces the older Application Access Policies. It also says these scoped grants are separate from the broad grants in Entra ID. So ask your IT provider to confirm the app doesn't also hold a tenant-wide mail grant, or the scope won't mean much.
This applies to any automation that reads email, including the kind we build. An order-entry or AP tool should be able to read the one inbox it works from. It shouldn't be able to read the owner's.
7. Check that the log is on
Microsoft says you find suspicious grants by searching the audit log for "Consent to application" activity, and that entries can take 30 minutes to 24 hours to show up. It also says that to see what a bad app actually did, mailbox auditing has to be turned on before the attack. Ask your provider to confirm it is, and how long your plan keeps the records.
Where the other side has a point
Locking down consent creates friction. If every new tool needs approval, people wait, and some of them will route around IT with personal accounts. That's the shadow AI problem in a different form. The admin consent workflow helps, but only if someone answers the requests within a day or two.
Most apps on the list are fine. A review will mostly turn up tools you already know. That's still worth knowing. But don't treat every entry as a threat or start removing things people rely on without asking them.
Bigger tools exist. Microsoft points larger organizations to Defender for Cloud Apps for ongoing OAuth app policies and alerts. It also suggests weekly reviews where there are many apps and many users. For a 50-300 person company, a review once or twice a year plus the consent settings may be enough. If you already pay for those tools, use them.
This doesn't replace MFA. The Midnight Blizzard case started with an account that had no MFA. App review is one more check, not a substitute for the basics.
What to ask your IT provider this week
- Can you send me the list of third-party apps with access to our Microsoft 365, and who granted each one?
- Which of them can read mail, and whose?
- Is user consent limited to verified publishers, or turned off?
- Is the admin consent workflow on, and who reviews the requests?
- For any tool that reads a shared inbox, is it scoped to that inbox only?
- Is mailbox auditing on, and how long do we keep the log?
If the answers come back quickly and clearly, you're in good shape. If they don't, that tells you something too. Our page on questions to ask any AI vendor about your data covers the vendor side of the same problem.
Common questions
How do I see which apps have access to our Microsoft 365?
In the Microsoft Entra admin center, go to Enterprise apps > All applications, open an app and select Permissions. The Admin consent tab shows organization-wide grants; the User consent tab shows grants from individual people. Microsoft also points admins to a script that exports every consent grant to a spreadsheet.
Can an employee give an app access to their email without IT?
Yes, by default. Microsoft's documentation says all users can consent to apps for permissions that don't need an admin, and its example is letting an app access their own mailbox. Your admin can change that setting.
Does resetting a password remove an app's access?
No, not for a malicious app that already has consent. Microsoft says normal steps like resetting passwords or requiring MFA aren't effective against illicit consent grants, because the app is external. You have to revoke the app's permission.
What is the admin consent workflow?
It's a Microsoft Entra setting. When a user can't approve an app on their own, they can send a request by email to admins you name as reviewers. A reviewer approves or denies it and the user is told.
Can an employee remove an app's access themselves?
Microsoft says users can go to myapps.microsoft.com, see the apps they've given access to, and revoke ones that look wrong.
Can I limit an app to one shared mailbox?
Yes. Exchange Online's RBAC for Applications lets an admin grant an app access with a scope, so it reaches only chosen mailboxes. Microsoft says these grants are separate from broad grants in Entra ID, so make sure the app doesn't also hold a tenant-wide mail permission.
How often should we review app permissions?
Microsoft suggests weekly in organizations with many apps and many users. For a 50-300 person company, a review once or twice a year plus tighter consent settings is a reasonable start; that schedule is our suggestion, not Microsoft's.
Sources
- Microsoft Learn, Configure how users consent to applications, checked Nov. 9, 2026
- Microsoft Learn, Review permissions granted to enterprise applications, checked Nov. 9, 2026
- Microsoft Learn, Detect and remediate illicit consent grants, checked Nov. 9, 2026
- Microsoft Learn, Configure the admin consent workflow, checked Nov. 9, 2026
- Microsoft Graph permissions reference (Mail.Read), checked Nov. 9, 2026
- Microsoft Learn, Role Based Access Control for Applications in Exchange Online, checked Nov. 9, 2026
- Microsoft Security blog, Midnight Blizzard: Guidance for responders on nation-state attack, Jan. 25, 2024
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