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Analysis · AI in business

Vendor bank-detail changes: a callback process your AP team can actually follow

A lot of payment fraud starts with one email: "we changed banks, please update our account." Here's a plain callback process for accounts payable, what the 2026 survey and FBI numbers say, and where it can still fail.

By Miguel GutierrezCo-founder, Peekgentic · Dallas
· 8 min read
Preview card: Vendor bank changes, a callback AP can follow.
One email asking to update a vendor's bank account is where most payment fraud starts.Peekgentic

In brief

Never change a vendor's bank details based on an email or a phone call alone. Call the vendor back on a number you already had on file before the request came in, talk to a contact you know, have them read the new details to you, and have a second person approve the change before any money goes to the new account. In the 2026 AFP survey, calling back on a number from official records was rated very effective by more organizations than any other email-fraud control.

  • 74% of organizations were hit by business email compromise in 2025, per the 2026 AFP survey.
  • Fraudsters mostly pose as vendors or executives asking to change payment instructions. Sometimes the email is from the vendor's real, hacked mailbox.
  • Call back on a number you had before the request. A number from the email confirms nothing.
  • Have a second person approve the change and flag the first payment to any new account.
  • If money goes out, call the bank fraud line first, then file at ic3.gov. Speed decides what you get back.

Why this one request matters so much

Business email compromise (BEC) is the scam where someone poses as a vendor or an executive by email and gets you to pay the wrong account. It's common. In the 2026 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey, 74% of organizations said they were affected by BEC in 2025. The survey was taken in January 2026 among 465 treasury practitioners at U.S. organizations, so it's a survey of finance staff, not a count of crimes.

The report's key highlights say fraudsters mainly pose as vendors or executives to request changes to payment instructions. That is the bank-detail change. It also says 39% of organizations got genuine emails that fraudsters had intercepted. In other words, the email can come from your vendor's real address, because the criminal is inside your vendor's mailbox.

The FBI sees the same thing from the other end. Its 2025 Internet Crime Report lists 24,768 BEC complaints and $3,046,598,558 in reported losses, the second-largest loss category after investment fraud. Those are only the cases people reported.

BEC reported to the FBI, by year

YearComplaintsReported losses
202321,489$2.95 billion
202421,442$2.77 billion
202524,768$3.05 billion

Source: FBI IC3, 2025 Internet Crime Report, three-year comparison tables. Complaints filed with IC3, not all incidents.

The mistake that undoes most callbacks

Nearly every finance team says it calls to confirm: 94% of organizations in the AFP survey verify payment requests by calling the payee back. The AFP report includes a story from a respondent that shows how that goes wrong. Someone posing as a client emailed the sales and AP teams with new banking details. AP called the number in the email to confirm. That number belonged to the fraudster. The company only avoided a loss because its system didn't save the change correctly, and a later wire bounced.

Another respondent described a scammer who took over a key vendor's mailbox, sent fake invoices that passed every normal approval, and asked for a bank change that was entered into the system before treasury could confirm it.

Both stories point at the same two gaps. The phone number came from the request itself. And the change went into the system before anyone verified it.

If the phone number came with the request, calling it confirms nothing.

What the survey says works

AFP asked organizations which email-fraud controls they use and how well each one works. Almost everyone uses the basics. The difference is in how many rate each one "very effective."

Email-fraud controls rated "very effective"

Percent of organizations, 2026 AFP survey (2025 data)

  1. Call back an authorized contact on a number from official records, not from the email63%
  2. Written policy to verify changes to invoices, bank details and contacts58%
  3. No payments started from email or other less secure messages53%
  4. Senior sign-off above a dollar threshold52%
  5. Staff training on spotting fake emails42%

Source: 2026 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey Report: Key Highlights, BEC prevention table. Ratings are respondents' opinions, not measured outcomes.

Training matters, but it scores lowest of the five. A process that doesn't depend on someone spotting a fake is stronger than one that does. That's the idea behind the steps below.

The callback process, step by step

This is written for a 50-300 person company with a small AP team. Adjust the names to your setup. The order matters more than the details.

1. Decide what triggers it

Any request to change where or how a vendor is paid: bank account or routing number, remit-to address, payment method (check to ACH, ACH to wire), or a "temporary" account for one payment. It doesn't matter if the request comes by email, phone, a letter or a form on your vendor portal. It also applies to customers asking you to send a refund to a new account, and to employees changing direct deposit.

2. Freeze, don't update

The person who gets the request doesn't touch the vendor record. They forward it to whoever owns vendor changes and reply only that it's being processed. No payment to that vendor goes to the new account until step 5 is done.

3. Call back on a number you already had

Use a phone number that was on file before the request arrived: the vendor master, a signed contract, a W-9, or an invoice from months ago. Never use a number from the email, its signature, an attached letter, or the person who called you. The FBI's guidance says to use secondary channels to verify requests for changes in account information. A secondary channel only counts if the criminal can't control it.

4. Ask, don't tell

Ask for someone you know, or for the vendor's AR or finance contact. Ask them to confirm they asked for a change and to read you the new routing and account numbers. Don't read the numbers to them; a caller on the wrong end will just say yes. If the vendor says they didn't ask for any change, you just caught a fraud attempt. Tell the vendor, because their mailbox may be compromised.

A callback script AP can keep at the desk

StepWhat to say or check
NumberFrom the vendor file, dated before the request. Write down where it came from.
Opening"We got a request to change your payment details. Did your company send it?"
Details"Please read me the new routing and account numbers." Match them to the request.
Reason"What changed?" A new bank is normal. "Our account is under audit, use this one for now" is a warning sign.
LogDate, time, number called, who answered, who on your side made the call.

Our suggested script, built from the AFP and FBI guidance above. Not a regulatory requirement.

5. A second person approves the change

The person who made the call shouldn't be the only person who changes the record. A second person checks the log and approves the change in your ERP or accounting system. If your system can require approval for bank-detail changes, turn that on. If it can't, run a weekly report of vendor bank changes and have someone outside AP review it. This is our suggestion; the survey's version is senior sign-off above a dollar threshold, which 52% rated very effective.

6. Watch the first payment

Flag the first payment to any new account. Some companies confirm with the vendor that it arrived before sending the next one. That's our suggestion, and it adds a few days. But a fraud caught on the first payment is cheaper than one caught on the third.

7. Know what to do if money already went out

Speed decides how much you get back. The FBI says to contact your bank right away and ask for a recall of the funds, then file at ic3.gov no matter the amount. The FBI's Recovery Asset Team works with banks to freeze money. In 2025 it handled 3,900 incidents with $1.16 billion in attempted theft and froze $679 million, a 58% success rate, according to the 2025 IC3 report. Put your bank's fraud line on the same card as the callback script.

Recovery is far from certain. In the AFP survey, 20% of organizations that had payments fraud in 2025 recovered none of the money. Among organizations under $1 billion in revenue that had fraud, 48% took a loss, and 24% of those got nothing back.

Your bank's rules changed this year too

If you pay vendors by ACH, your company is what the ACH network calls an originator. Nacha, which runs the ACH rules, says new monitoring rules took effect in 2026. They require risk-based processes reasonably intended to catch ACH credits sent under "false pretenses," which includes someone lying about who they are or who owns an account. AFP's summary says the last group of originators was due by June 22, 2026. Nacha's own list of controls reads a lot like this page: clear procedures for validating payment instruction changes, verifying through trusted channels, and extra approvals for unusual payments. If your bank hasn't asked how you handle this, ask them.

Where the other side has a point

It slows things down. Callbacks take time, and some vendors get annoyed. A vendor waiting on a late payment won't love a three-day hold. Telling vendors up front that you verify every change helps.

A callback isn't foolproof. If a criminal controls the vendor's phone system, or the number on file was already wrong, a callback can fail. AI voice cloning adds a new risk. In the AFP survey, 7% of organizations with payments fraud reported a deepfake attempt. Still small, but it's one more reason the second approver and the first-payment check matter.

Not every fraud is a bank change. Checks are still the most-hit payment method in the AFP survey, at 58% of organizations. Fake invoices from a real vendor's mailbox can pass every approval, as one respondent's story shows. This process covers one door, not every door.

Small vendors may not have a "finance contact." For a two-person supplier, the owner is AR. That's fine. The rule is about the phone number, not the job title.

Where automation fits, and where it doesn't

Software can help with the boring parts. It can spot a bank-detail change in an incoming email or invoice, stop that vendor's payments, open a task for the callback, and keep the log. It can compare the remit-to details on every invoice against the vendor master and flag any mismatch.

What it shouldn't do is make the change. An AP tool that reads email should never be able to update vendor bank details by itself, because email is exactly where the fraud comes in. We cover how we set that line in using Claude for accounts payable and why a person approves every step. The call stays with a person.

A one-page version for your AP binder

  1. Any request to change how or where we pay someone triggers this process.
  2. Don't update the record. Forward it to the vendor-change owner.
  3. Call back on a number we had before the request. Never one from the request.
  4. Have them read the new details to us. Log the call.
  5. A second person approves the change.
  6. Flag the first payment to the new account.
  7. If money went to the wrong place: call the bank fraud line first, then file at ic3.gov.

Common questions

How do I verify a vendor's bank account change?

Call the vendor back on a phone number you had on file before the request came in, such as the vendor master or a signed contract. Ask a known contact to confirm the request and read you the new account details. Never use a number from the email or the caller. Then have a second person approve the change.

Is calling the vendor back enough?

It's the control most organizations rate very effective in the 2026 AFP survey (63%), but only if the number comes from your own records. It can still fail if the vendor's phone is compromised or a voice is faked, so pair it with a second approver and a check on the first payment.

How common is business email compromise?

In the 2026 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey, 74% of organizations said they were affected by BEC in 2025. The FBI's IC3 received 24,768 BEC complaints in 2025 with about $3.05 billion in reported losses.

What should we do if we already paid a fake account?

Call your bank's fraud line right away and ask them to recall the funds, then file a complaint at ic3.gov. In 2025 the FBI's Recovery Asset Team froze $679 million of $1.16 billion in attempted theft across 3,900 incidents.

Do Nacha's 2026 rules apply to my company?

If you send ACH payments, you are an originator under Nacha's rules. Nacha says the 2026 rules require risk-based processes reasonably intended to catch ACH credits sent under false pretenses. Ask your bank what they expect from you.

Can AI handle vendor bank changes?

It can flag them, stop payments and track the callback. It shouldn't make the change itself, because email is where the fraud comes in. A person should make the call and a second person should approve the change.

What are warning signs in a bank change request?

Urgency, a "temporary" account, a reason like an audit, a new phone number in the signature, a lookalike email domain, or a request to keep it quiet. AFP says more than half of organizations got emails from domains that differed from real ones by a letter or two.

Sources

  1. AFP, Over 75% of US Firms Experienced Payments Fraud in 2025 (press release, 2026 Payments Fraud and Control Survey), April 14, 2026
  2. 2026 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey Report: Key Highlights (hosted by Truist, the report's underwriter)
  3. Nacha, Business Email Compromise Attempts Rose Sharply in 2025, Report Finds, May 13, 2026
  4. Nacha, Practical Steps for Corporate Payment Practitioners to Reduce Credit-Push Payments Fraud, Oct. 28, 2026
  5. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 Internet Crime Report
  6. FBI IC3, Business Email Compromise: The $43 Billion Scam (PSA I-050422-PSA), May 4, 2022

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Published November 10, 2026 · Written by Miguel Gutierrez, Co-Founder, Peekgentic (Dallas, TX). Every statistic links its source.